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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW-PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME: A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE
In People v. Santos, a New York woman charged with child bat-
tering raised the defense of premenstrual syndrome (PMS) in a pre-
trial hearing.2 Although English courts have recognized PMS as a
mitigating factor in sentencing,3 Santos presented the first opportu-
nity for an American court to consider PMS in a criminal case.4 Plea
bargaining ultimately reduced the felony charge to a misdemeanor
and precluded a legal test of the controversial defense.5 Increased
publicity and recognition of PMS in both England and the United
States,6 however, may prompt more criminal defendants to assert the
1 No. IK046229 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Nov. 3, 1982).
2 Berreby, PMS Case Ends with Cuilty Plea, NAT'L UJ., Nov. 15, 1982, at 36, col. 1.
3 Regina v. Smith, [19821 Crim. L.R. 531 (C.A.); Regina v. Craddock, [1981] 1 C.L. 49;
Tybor, Women on TriaL' New Defense, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (discussing the
unreported decision of Regina v. English, decided by the Norwich Crown Court on Novem-
ber 10, 1981). Additionally, several commentators have noted that the French legal system
recognizes PMS as a form of temporary insanity. None, however, has cited a French author-
ity to support the proposition. See, e.g., Gonzalez, Premenstrual Syndrome: An Ancient' Woe Deserv-
ing of Modern Scrutiny, 245 J. A.M.A. 1393, 1393 (1981); Sharma, Premenstrual Syndrome, 226
THE PRACTITIONER 1091 (1982); Tybor, supra, at 16. Apparently, Professor Oleck was the
first American authority to assert that the French categorize PMS as a form of temporary
insanity. Oleck, Legal Aspects of Premenstrual Tension, 166 INT'L REC.'OF MED. & GEN. PRAC.
CLINics 492, 496 (1953). Although Oleck cites no authority to support this statement, article
64 of the French Penal Code provides criminal defenses which could encompass PMS-in-
duced behavior. 1977-78 CODE PENAL, art. 64.
4 Although Santos was the first attempt to use the PMS defense in a criminal case in the
United States, premenstrual syndrome and its symptoms have been discussed in several civil
cases in the United States. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d 1 (3rd
Cir. 1973) (review of federal order to control distribution of drug aimed at relieving premen-
strual tension); Crockett v. Cohen, 299 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Va. 1969) (review of HEW deci-
sion disallowing disability benefits to a woman suffering from premenstrual tension); Reid v.
Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 188 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (reversing Real Estate
Commission order which suspended broker's license of woman arrested for shoplifting while
suffering from premenstrual tension); Edwards v. Ford, 69 Ga. App. 578, 26 S.E.2d 306 (1943)
(wrongful death action in which defense attributed driver's unconsciousness to premenstrual
symptoms); Tingen v. Tingen, 251 Or. 438, 446 P.2d 185 (1968) (child custody action in
which evidence of PMS symptoms was introduced regarding the mother's competency).
5 Berreby, supra note 2, at 36.
6 For recent discussions within the legal profession, see, for example, Taylor & Dalton,
Premenstrual Syndrome: A New Criminal Defense?, 19 CAL. W.L. REv. 269 (1983); Note, Premen-
strual Stress Syndrome As A Defense In Criminal Cases, 1983 DUKE L.J. 176; Recent Development,
Premenstrual Sndrome, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219 (1983); Tybor, supra note 3. Within the
medical profession, see, for example, Reid & Yen, Premenstrual Syndrome, 139 AM. J. OBSTET.
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PMS defense. American courts must therefore decide how to re-
spond to PMS in a criminal case.
In this comment we first define PMS and discuss its incidence,
cause and treatment. Next, we present the recent cases in which de-
fendants have asserted PMS as a criminal defense, and discuss the
judicial reactions to it. We then analyze the ways in which a defend-
ant's claim of PMS might affect the outcome of a criminal trial in the
United States. Finally, we discuss several factors which may impede
recognition of a PMS defense within the American legal system.
I. The Premenstrual Syndrome
Maureen, a thirty-year old housewife, is a typical PMS sufferer. 7
Doctors first diagnosed Maureen's premenstrual syndrome when she
was a teenager. Since then, her condition has progressively wors-
ened. During the seven days before menstruation, Maureen becomes
irritable and tense; she "over-reacts" to stress and becomes overly
emotional. She is aggressive and violent toward her husband and
children. On the first day of menstruation, however, all these symp-
toms cease and she becomes calm, friendly, and rational. PMS has
induced Maureen to attempt suicide on five separate occasions, each
on the last day before menstruation. In these attempts, Maureen
took aspirin and valium overdoses, slashed her wrists, stabbed herself,
and jumped under a train. On one other occasion, Maureen lost her
temper and struck her five-year-old daughter simply because she
would not stop crying. Maureen was so shocked by her actions that
she asked that her children to be taken into protective care.
Maureen's traumas are similar to those which many PMS suffer-
ers experience. Although most women experience discomfort during
the paramenstruum,8 the severity and cumulative effect of PMS
symptoms distinguish PMS sufferers from most other women. When
the traumas of PMS cause its victims to engage in antisocial behav-
ior, our criminal justice system must become involved.
More than fifty years after the first recognition of PMS in medi-
cal literature, 9 medical experts still do not agree on the definition of
GYNECOL. 85 (1981); Sharma, supra note 3. In the popular press, see, for example, Clausen,
Not Guilty Because of PMS?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 111; Henig, Dispelling Menstrual
Myths, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 65.
7 K. DALTON, THE PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME AND PROGESTERONE THERAPY 33
(1977).
8 See note 17 infra.
9 In 1931, R. T. Frank discussed women suffering from "indescribable tension and a
desire to find relief by foolish actions difficult to restrain." Frank, The Hormonal Causes of
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PMS.' 0 In 1965, Doctors Hamish Sutherland and Iain Stewart syn-
thesized much of the existing PMS research.II They defined the syn-
drome as "any combination of emotional or physical features which
occur[s] cyclically in a female before menstruation, and which re-
gress[es] and disappear[s] during menstruation .... 12 Dr.
Katharina Dalton, who has conducted PMS research in England for
more than thirty years,' 3 defines PMS as "the presence of monthly
recurrent symptoms in the premenstruum or early menstruation with
a complete absence of symptoms after menstruation."' 4 According to
Dalton, the behavioral and psychological symptoms of PMS include
irritability, anger, confusion, depression, amnesia and uncontrollable
impulses resulting in violence. 15 Other doctors identify the most
common physical symptoms as headache, breast swelling and tender-
ness, abdominal bloating, edema of extremeties, fatigue, increased
thirst or appetite, acneiform eruptions, and constipation.' 6 Although
Premenstrual Tension, 26 ARCH. NEUROL. PSYCHIATRY 1053 (1931). Although the medical
profession has only recently begun to systematically study the premenstrual syndrome, re-
corded descriptions of PMS symptoms date back to the sixth century B.C. Semonides wrote
of a likely PMS sufferer:
[She] has two different sorts ofmood. One day she is all smiles and happiness ....
There is no better wife . . . nor prettier. Then another day, there'll be no living
with her, you can't get within sight, or come near her, or she flies into a rage and
holds you at a distance like a bitch with pups, cantankerous and cross with the
world.
Tybor, supra note 3, at 12.
10 Dr. Anthony Clare, a psychiatrist at the University of London's General Practice Re-
search Unit, described any attempt to define PMS as a "nightmare." Premenstrual Tension
Defense Prompts Debate, Int'l Herald Trib., Dec. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 1. See also O'Brien, The
Premenstrual Syndrome: A Review of the Present Status of Therapy, 24 DRUGS 140, 140-41 (1982);
Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 85-86.
11 Sutherland & Stewart, A Critical Analysis of the Premenstrual Syndrome, 1 LANCET 1180
(1965).
12 Id. at 1182.
13 Dr. Dalton, Director of the Premenstrual Syndrome Clinic at London's University
College Hospital, is a pioneer in the study and treatment of PMS. In 1953, Dalton co-au-
thored an article with Dr. Raymond Greene, The PremenstrualSyndrome, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1007
(1953), and has subsequently written two books and 51 articles on the subject. Taylor &
Dalton, supra note 6, at 270 n.5. Over the past 20 years, Dalton has studied nearly 30,000
PMS cases. She testified as an expert witness in Smith, Craddock, and English. Tybor, supra
note 3, at 12, 16.
14 K. Dalton, The Legal Implications of Premenstrual Syndrome 1 (1982) (unpublished
article). Dalton suggests that a diagnosis of premenstrual syndrome is only valid where the
PMS symptoms have recurred in at least three consecutive menstrual cycles. Id.
15 Id.
16 Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 85-86. Dalton has also emphasized the wide range of
physical PMS symptoms, noting that "no tissues in the body are exempt from the cyclical
changes of the menstrual cycle . . . ." K. DALTON, supra note 7, at 20. Various medical
authorities have identified approximately 150 different symptoms associated with PMS. Tay-
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women might experience a number of these symptoms at other times,
these symptoms constitute premenstrual syndrome only if they "oc-
cur with cyclical regularity at the appropriate time."'17
Medical experts also fail to agree on the cause of the premen-
strual syndrome. Doctors have proposed various causal theories,
none of which has received unanimous acceptance. 18 Among the
causes suspected are excesses in estrogen and prolactin; hypoglyce-
mia; fluid retention; and deficiencies in progesterone, vitamin B6,
and vitamin A.19 Two experts recently reviewed these and other
causal theories and concluded that a multitude of psychological, neu-
rological, and glandular factors causes PMS.2°
In 1953, Dr. Dalton and Dr. Raymond Greene suggested that
the cause of PMS might be an imbalance in the ovarial production of
the hormones progesterone and oestradiol. 21 Modern tests, however,
have failed to confirm this hypothesis. 2 2 Dalton insists that these
tests are inconclusive because progesterone is secreted sporadically,
making biochemical analyses for the hormone unreliable. 23
Because the specific cause of PMS is unclear, the efficacy of any
treatment is neither fully understood nor universally accepted. 24 Al-
though researchers have conducted several studies to find the ideal
treatment for PMS, these studies have been inconclusive, due partly
lor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 272 n.10. See also Wallach & Rubin, The Premenstrual Syndrome
and Criminal Responsibility, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 209, 212 n.ll (1971).
17 K. DALTON, supra note 7, at 20. Diagnosis depends not as much on the specific symp-
toms as on the time relationship between symptoms and menstruation. Id. See also O'Brien,
supra note 10, at 141. Taylor and Dalton identify the "appropriate time" as the paramen-
struum: the last four days before menstruation and the first four days of menstruation. Tay-
lor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 272 n. 13. Women in the paramenstruum are disproportionately
represented among women in car accidents (48%), prison admissions (49%), emergency hospi-
tal admissions (53%), and attempted suicides (50%). Henig, supra note 6, at 68, col. 1-2.
18 O'Brien,supra note 10, at 141.
19 See Gonzalez, supra note 3, at 1393; O'Brien, supra note 10, at 141; Reid & Yen, supra
note 6, at 86-97.
20 Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 85.
21 Taylor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 270 n.5; Greene, Letters to the Editor. Premenstrual
Tension and Equality, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 19, 1981, at 13, col. 5.
22 See Gonzalez, supra note 3, at 1393-95; Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 87. Because mod-
ern tests have failed to prove Dalton and Greene's original hypothesis that hormonal imbal-
ances cause PMS, Greene has conceded that progesterone deficiencies alone do not cause
PMS. Although Greene agrees with Dalton that progesterone injections effectively treat PMS
sufferers, he notes that "this no more proves that progesterone deficiency is the cause of the
trouble than that aspirin deficiency is the cause of headaches." Greene, supra note 21.
23 Gonzalez, supra note 3, at 1393.
24 O'Brien, supra note 10, at 141; Premenstrual Syndrome, 2 LANCET 1393, 1394 (1981). See
generally Reid & Yen, supra note 6.
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to difficulties in evaluating the wide range of PMS symptoms. 25
Moreover, most studies have lacked sufficient control and rigor to
allow for meaningful interpretation of the results.26
Nevertheless, some doctors have achieved varying degrees of suc-
cess in treating PMS sufferers.27 Their methods include hormonal
therapy, psychotherapy, diuretics, vitamins, and oral contracep-
tives.28 Dalton has effectively treated PMS for the past thirty years
with natural progesterone injections. 29 In spite of this history of suc-
cessful treatment, other doctors have been reluctant to adopt proges-
terone treatment because there is no consensus as to how or why it
works. 30
Medical experts also disagree on the number of women who suf-
fer from PMS. Estimates of the incidence of PMS vary according to
the breadth of the definition used.3' One study suggests that nearly
twenty percent of all women requires treatment for the syndrome.32
Another study suggests that between seventy and ninety percent of
the female population experiences PMS symptoms, while twenty to
forty percent suffers temporary mental or physical incapacitation
due to PMS.33 Although a majority of menstruating women exper-
iences some physical, psychological, and/or behavioral changes
which they regard as tolerable,34 the American legal profession
should direct its attention toward those PMS sufferers who require
treatment.
Although medical experts disagree on the diagnosis, cause, and
treatment of PMS, they do agree that the syndrome causes marked
25 O'Brien, supra note 10, at 140.
26 Id. Premenstrual Syndrome, supra note 24, at 1394.
27 See Gonzalez, supra note 3, at 1393-96; O'Brien, supra note 10, at 141-5 1; Premenstrual
Syndrome, supra note 24, at 1394; Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 86-94; Wallach & Rubin, supra
note 16, at 291-96.
28 See Gonzalez, supra note 3, at 1393-96; O'Brien, supra note 10, at 141-5 1; Premenstrual
Syndrome, supra note 24, at 1394; Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 86-94; Wallach & Rubin, supra
note 16, at 291-96.
29 K. DALTON, supra note 7, at 1.
30 Greene regards this reluctance as "understandable but wrong-headed. For centuries
we have used remedies that we do not understand. . . . The fact is that progesterone works.
We are hoping soon to find out why. Meanwhile its use in treatment can eliminate much
unhappiness and even crime." Greene, supra note 21 (emphasis in original).
31 O'Brien, supra note 10, at 140. Sutherland and Stewart concede that their definition
would classify approximately 97% of all menstruating women as PMS sufferers. Sutherland
& Stewart, supra note 11, at 140.
32 Gonzalez, supra note 3, at 1395.
33 Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 86.
34 Wallach & Rubin, supra note 16, at 212-13.
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psychological anomalies. 35 These psychological anomalies have sig-
nificantly affected the behavioral patterns of thousands of women.36
These women demonstrate the greatest potential for PMS-induced
criminal behavior 7 Medical studies have linked PMS to an in-
creased number of suicide attempts, automobile accidents, and mis-
cellaneous criminal acts.38 Nonetheless, the legal community has not
yet paid sufficient attention to the correlation between PMS and
crime.
II. Recent Decisions
In three recent English cases, and one recent American case, de-
fendants asserted PMS as a criminal defense. 39 Each defendant
claimed that PMS prevented her from either controlling her behav-
ior or forming the requisite criminal intent.40 Although the defense
met with varying degrees of success, in each case the defendant re-
ceived a light sentence relative to the crime with which she was
orginally charged.41
In February, 1980, an English jury convicted Sandie Craddock
of stabbing to death a fellow barmaid.42 Craddock, at age twenty-
nine, had more than thirty prior convictions and had attempted sui-
cide on at least twenty-five separate occasions.43 The courts had re-
peatedly committed her to mental hospitals. Numerous psychiatrists,
however, claimed they were unable to help Craddock and released
her.44
In an effort to establish a cyclical pattern of criminal behavior,
Craddock's counsel reviewed diaries which Craddock kept over the
years. He discovered that each criminal offense and suicide attempt
35 See, e.g., Brush, The Possible Mechanisms Causing the Premenstrual Tension Syndrome, 4 CUR-
RENT MED. RESEARCH OPIN. 9, 12 (Supp. 1977); Wallach & Rubin, supra note 16, at 236.
36 Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 85; Wallach & Rubin, supra note 16, at 224.
37 Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 85.
38 K. DALTON, supra note 7, at 4, 144-48; Gonzalez, supra note 3, at 1393; Reid & Yen,
supra note 6, at 85; Wallach & Rubin, supra note 16, at 224-32.
39 See notes 1 and 3 supra and accompanying text.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Regina v. Craddock, [1981] 1 C.L. 49.
43 Appellant's Perfected Grounds of Appeal at 2, Regina v. Smith, [1982] Crim. L.R. 531
(C.A.). After the decision in Regina o. Craddock, Sandie Craddock changed her name to Sandie
Smith. She was charged with a later offense which gave rise to Regina v. Smith. Smith's coun-
sel represented her during both trials and on appeal in Regina v. Smith. He was therefore able
to provide the court with Craddock's legal and medical history.
44 Craddock, 1 C.L. at 49.
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occurred at approximately the same time of the month.45 Dr. Dalton
examined Craddock and evaluated the available records of Crad-
dock's past behavior. Dalton noted that the previous criminal acts
occurred at intervals of 29.04 ±1.47 days.46 The suicide attempts,
many of which took place in prison and were meticulously docu-
mented by prison officials, occurred at intervals of 29.55 ±1.45
days.47 Based on these findings, Dalton diagnosed Craddock as a
PMS sufferer and began to treat her with massive doses of progester-
one.48 The treatment radically changed Craddock's personality; she
calmed down and her behavior stabilized.
49
At trial, the Crown reduced its murder charge to manslaughter,
due to Craddock's "diminished responsibility. '50 The jury returned
a guilty verdict. In light of Dalton's diagnosis and effective treat-
ment, however, the court released Craddock on probation, provided
she continue to receive progesterone treatment under Dalton's
direction. 5'
Craddock changed her name to Sandie Smith shortly after
trial.52 During the next few months, except for one minor incident in
October, 1980, 53 Smith's personality and behavior remained normal.
45 Appellant's Perfected Grounds of Appeal, supra note 43, at 2.
46 K. Dalton, supra note 14; at 2.
47 Id.
48 Appellant's Perfected Grounds of Appeal, supra note 43, at 2-3.
49 Craddock, 1 C.L. at 49.
50 Regina v. Smith, No. 1/A/82, at para. 7 (C.A. Crim. Div. Apr. 27, 1982) (available on
LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) [hereinafter cited as LEXIS]. ,"Diminished responsibil-
ity", a statutory mitigation in England, grants the judge discretion in sentencing a defendant
charged with murder and affected by:
1) an abnormality of the mind, arising from:
(a) arrested development; or
(b) inherent causes; or
(c) disease or injury; and
2) which results in substantial impairment of mental responsibility.
Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, ch. II, § 2(1), quoted in G. WILIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 622-23 (1978).
51 Appellant's Perfected Grounds of Appeal, supra note 43, at 2-3.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 3. In October, 1980, a Health Services administrative error caused Smith to miss
four consecutive progesterone injections. During this period, Smith threw a rock through a
window, an offense which she had committed many times in the past. She promptly surren-
dered herself to the police, and Health Services immediately restored her progesterone treat-
ment. Smith's solicitors explained Smith's condition to the magistrates. After consulting with
the administration of the Central Criminal Court, the magistrates granted Smith a condi-
tional release. Id.
This incident raises a number of related issues which are beyond the scope of this com-
ment. Among these issues are: (1) the liability of a PMS sufferer who negligently fails to seek
or continue treatment after becoming aware of her condition; and (2) the liability of a physi-
[Vol. 59:253]
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Her probation officer was completely satisfied with Smith's behavior
and the progesterone treatment's effectiveness. 54 Between October
and May, however, Dalton began to reduce the dosage and number
of Smith's progesterone injections.55 By early June, 1981, Smith was
receiving her smallest doses of progesterone since March, 1980.56
During her June paramenstruum, Smith twice threatened to kill a
police officer because he had insulted her three years earlier.57
Shortly after the second threat, police arrested her outside the of-
ficer's station. She was carrying a knife and apparently waiting to
attack the officer.58 The Crown charged Smith with two counts of
threatening to kill the police officer and one count of carrying an
offensive weapon in public without authority or excuse.59 At trial,
the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. The court, how-
ever, recognized PMS as a mitigating factor and sentenced Smith to
three years probation.r°
On appeal, Smith's counsel urged the court to recognize a new
defense of uncontrollable impulse due to the defendant's medical
condition. 61 He conceded that Smith acted consciously, but main-
tained that she was suffering from premenstrual syndrome and could
not control her behavior.62 Smith's counsel acknowledged that Eng-
lish courts do not recognize a general defense of uncontrollable im-
pulse.63 He argued, however, that where an uncontrollable impulse
is caused by a specific, identifiable, and remediable medical problem,
particularly PMS, for which a defendant is blameless, the court
cian who negligently fails to diagnose or treat a PMS sufferer who commits further violent
acts.
54 Id.
55 Some commentators have noted the unpleasantness, inconvenience, expense, and pos-
sible side-effects of prolonged progesterone treatment. See, e.g., Brush, supra note 35, at 13;
Rome, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1982, at C7, col. 3. Presumably, Dr. Dalton
lowered Smith's progesterone dosage because of similar concerns for Smith's well-being and
the difficulty in determining how much progesterone was necessary to stabilize Smith's be-
havior. Dalton testified that the progesterone levels which she administered to Smith were
too low, and insufficient to control her PMS-induced behavior: "If the drug [were] with-
drawn, she would revert to loss of self-control and to a confused state." Transcript of Official
Shorthand Notes at 9-10, Regina v. Smith, [19821 Crim. L.R. 531 (C.A.) [hereinafter cited as
Record].
56 Appellant's Perfected Grounds of Appeal, supra note 43, at 3.
57 Smith claimed that the officer had treated her rudely and slapped her across the face.
Record, supra note 55, at 5.
58 Id. at 4.
59 LEXIS, supra note 50, at para. 1.
60 Id
61 Appellant's Perfected Grounds of Appeal, supra note 43, at 7.
62 LEXIS, supra note 50, at para. 15.
63 Id. at para. 18.
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should not hold the defendant responsible for her conduct. 64 He ar-
gued that Smith's premenstrual syndrome should therefore provide a
substantive defense, absolving her of criminal liabilty for her
conduct.65
The English Court of Appeal, however, refused to recognize
PMS as a substantive defense, 66 finding it contrary to the purpose of
criminal law to allow a defendant to commit a violent act and then
be acquitted and discharged while still a threat to society. The court
regarded it more appropriate to consider PMS as a mitigating factor
in sentencing than as a substantive defense. In this manner, the
court reasoned that it could both ensure that the defendant receive
the necessary treatment, and monitor her subsequent conduct. Con-
sequently, the court upheld the trial court's three-year probation
order.67
In a contemporaneous proceeding, another English court also
accepted PMS as a mitigating factor in sentencing. In December,
1980, Mrs. Christine Ann English deliberately pinned her lover
against a utility pole with her car, killing him.68 At trial, Dr. Dalton
testified that English suffered from PMS which caused her to become
irritable and aggressive, and to lose self-control. 69 The defense also
introduced medical evidence that suggested English had suffered
from PMS since 1966.70
The Crown subsequently reduced the initial murder charge to
the lesser offense of "manslaughter due to diminished responsibility."
English plead guilty to this lesser offense. In sentencing English, the
trial judge accepted PMS as a mitigating factor, concluding that
English had acted under "wholly exceptional circumstances."' 71 The
court granted English a twelve-month conditional discharge and
banned her from driving for one year.72
Shortly following these three English cases, the first American
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at paras. 16-17.
67 Id.
68 Regina v. English, an unreported criminal case, was decided by the Norwich Crown
Court on November 10, 1981, one day after Regina v. Smith. English, the third British case to
raise the PMS defense, received considerable coverage in the press. See, e.g., Bennett, Pre-
mentrual Tension: Exrcuse or Reason?, Police Review, Jan. 29, 1982, at 168; Commentary, Regina
v. Smith, [1982] Crim. L.R. 532 (C.A.); Premenstrual Tension Defense Prompts Debate, supra note
10, at 1, col. 1; Tybor, supra note 3, at 1-2.
69 Bennett, supra note 68, at 168.
70 Premenstrual Tension Defense Prompts Defense, supra note 10, at 1, col. 3.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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criminal case in which a defendant asserted the PMS defense ended
without a legal test of the PMS issue. 73 In People v. Santos, police
arrested Shirley Santos after an emergency medical team diagnosed
her daughter as a victim of child abuse. 74 The Brooklyn District At-
torney's office initially charged Santos with assault and endangering
the welfare of a child, both felonies. 75
Santos asserted PMS in a pre-trial hearing as a complete defense
to her criminal behavior, not as a mitigating factor. 76 She conceded
that she beat her child, but maintained that she had blacked out as a
result of premenstrual syndrome and did not know what she was do-
ing.77 Santos argued that she therefore had not formed the necessary
criminal intent and should not be held responsible for her actions. 78
The court did not rule on the merits of the PMS defense, but sug-
gested that since psychological disturbances are admissible as evi-
dence relating to criminal intent, physiological disturbances might
likewise be admitted.79 After lengthy negotiations, the prosecutor
dropped the felony charges and Santos pleaded guilty to harrass-
ment, a misdemeanor8 0 Santos received no sentence, no probation,
and no fine, even though her four-year-old daughter spent two weeks
in the hospital as a result of the incident.8 1
73 People v. Santos, No. 1K046229 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Nov. 3, 1982), dissed in Berreby,
supra note 2, at 36. Santos withdrew her PMS defense in exchange for the District Attorney's
promise to drop felony charges. Santos then pleaded guilty to harassment, a non-criminal
violation. Benson, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1982, at 18, col. 4.
74 Clausen, supra note 6.
75 Berreby, supra note 2. See also Benson, supra note 73.
76 Berreby, supra note 2. The pre-trial motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice,
but Santos clearly indicated that she would pursue the PMS defense at trial. See also Clausen,
supra note 6.
77 Santos did not protest her arrest, but repeatedly attempted to explain: "I don't re-
member what happened. I would never hurt my baby. . . I just got my period." Id. Com-
pare this statement to testimony given by Dr. Dalton at the Smith trial one year earlier.
Dalton compared a woman suffering from PMS to a baby batterer. In both instances, an
otherwise loving mother can act as if in an alcoholic stupor, with no memory of it afterwards.
"They do not know what they are doing. They have no intent at all. They have not planned
it out before. It is not premeditated." Record, supra note 55, at 11.
78 Clausen, supra note 6.
79 Berreby, supra note 2.
80 Id. The District Attorney's Office claimed that the plea bargain proved that PMS is a
meritless defense. Santos's attorney argued, to the contrary, that the potency of the defense
ultimately persuaded the District Attorney's Office to negotiate for a lesser plea. Id. See also
Benson, supra note 73.
81 Berreby, supra note 2. In a contemporaneous proceeding, however, a family court
stripped Santos of custody of the child. Id.
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III. Legal Analysis: Substantive Defense or Mitigation?
Craddock, Smith, English, and Santos may indicate a trend toward
recognition of PMS in criminal cases. American courts must decide
how to respond. Two alternatives seem most realistic. First, the
courts could recognize PMS as a substantive defense. Thus, courts
might analogize PMS to one of the various insanity rules or recognize
a new defense of "automatism caused by premenstrual syndrome."
Second, American courts could follow the developing English prac-
tice and accept PMS as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
A. PMS as a Substantive Defense
Generally, criminal law is designed to punish only those individ-
uals who have committed morally culpable acts which the law pro-
hibits.8 2 The law recognizes, however, that certain individuals, such
as the legally insane, have a limited ability to reason and exercise free
choice. 83 Most courts therefore recognize legal insanity as a substan-
tive defense to criminal conduct. 84 The behavioral manifestations of
premenstrual syndrome are similar to those of legal insanity.8 5 Be-
cause of this similarity, American courts might analogize PMS to le-
gal insanity and provide PMS sufferers with a substantive defense to
criminal behavior.
Each jurisdiction in the United States has adopted one or more
tests to determine whether or not an individual is legally insane,
therefore deserving special exclusion from criminal liability.86 Com-
mon to each test are two basic requirements. The defendant must
82 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28, 35 (1968).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
84 See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
85 See Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 85.
86 American courts have recognized four primary variations of the insanity defense. W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 37-38 (1972). The majority of jurisdictions rely
upon the traditional M'Naghten rule. This rule states that a defendant shall not be held
criminally liable if, at the time of the offense, he was suffering under a mental disease or
defect and such condition prevented him from knowing the nature and quality of his act, or
that his act was wrong. Id. § 37.
Approximately one-third of the jurisdictions supplement the M'Naghten rule with the
"irresistible impulse" test which excuses liability if the defendant had a mental disease which
prevented him from controlling his conduct. Id.
A few jurisdictions follow the Durham-McDonald test which excuses criminal liability if
the defendant's conduct was the "product" of a mental disease or defect. Id. § 38.
The Model Penal Code recommends a fourth test. This test excuses criminal conduct
which is the result of a mental disease or defect if the defendant lacked "substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law." Id. See also A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 45-88 (1967); Dutile &
Singer, What Now For The Insanity Defense?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1104 (1983).
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prove: (1) that he or she suffers from a mental disease or defect, and
(2) that a causal nexus exists between the mental disease or defect
and the criminal conduct.8 7
Strictly speaking, the premenstrual syndrome fails to meet any
of the insanity tests. PMS is not a disease or defect of the mind, but a
physiological disorder.88 It therefore fails to meet the first require-
ment of all legal insanity tests-a mental disease or defect.89 Women
suffering from PMS are not "insane." To classify them as such
would distort the insanity defense and fail to responsively address the
pressing legal and medical issues peculiar to PMS.
Because PMS is not a disease or defect of the mind, it might fit
more appropriately within the automatism defense. 9° The automa-
tism defense excuses criminal conduct committed while the defend-
ant is in an unconscious or semiconscious state.9' The automaton
acts involuntarily and therefore without intent, exercise of free will,
or knowledge of the act. 92 Although some forms of automatism result
from mental illness or deficiency, physiological anomalies also cause
automatism in individuals with healthy minds. 93 Similarly, the phys-
87 Wallach & Rubin, supra note 16, at 238.
88 See generally Brush, supra note 35. Although there is considerable disagreement within
the medical profession as to the precise cause of PMS, most experts now agree that PMS is a
physiological disorder and not a disease or defect of the mind. See text accompanying notes
18-23 supra. See also Henig, supra note 6, at 75, col. 1, where the author states: "[F]or all the
emotional manifestations of the premenstrual syndrome, a consensus is building that it is
indeed physiological in origin."
89 Consequently, it is not necessary to consider the second requirement, a causal nexus
between the mental disease or defect and the criminal conduct.
90 See Regina v. Quick, [1973] 3 All E.R. 347, 350, where the defendant, a male nurse
who assaulted a patient, asserted automatism resulting from diabetic hypoglycemia as a de-
fense. The court described the defendant's insulin imbalance in terms parallel to the hormo-
nal imbalance of a PMS sufferer:
[Tihe higher functions of the mind are affected. As the effects of the imbalance
became more marked, more and more mental functions are upset .... In the later
stages of mental impairment a sufferer may become aggressive and violent without
being able to control himself or without knowing at the time what he was doing.
However, it should be noted that the Court of Appeal in Reg'na v. Smith considered Quick and
concluded that "there is no question of automatism providing a defense in this case." LEXIS,
supra note 50, at para. 12. The court reasoned that, even though Smith was unable to control
her behavior, she consciously intended to act as she did. Id. at para. 14.
91 In England and the United States, the courts have defined automatism as "the state of
a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing .... It means
unconscious involuntary action and it is a defense because the mind does not go with what is
being done." Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, [1963] A.C. 386, [1961] 3 All
E.R. 523. See also Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo. 1981).
92 Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 145.
93 Among the physiological causes of automatism are: somnambulism, somnolenture,
delirium from fever or drugs, diabetic shock, and epileptic black-outs. State v. Caddell, 287
N.C. 266, 285, 215 S.E. 2d 348, 360 (1975).
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iological anomalies of PMS cause behavior in women which Ameri-
can courts might classify as automatistic.
Several American jurisdictions have recognized automatism,
sometimes called unconsciousness, as a complete, affirmative de-
fense.94 These jurisdictions hold that automatism is a separate and
distinct defense from legal insanity. In contrast to a defendant found
not guilty by reason of insanity, who may be committed to a mental
institution, a defendant who successfully pleads automatism will be
acquitted and released. 95 Mental institutions serve no rehabilitative
value for an automatistic defendant. These institutions treat individ-
uals with psychological disorders, not physiological anomalies.96
Similarly, the traditional reasons for imprisonment do not apply to
automatons. Imprisonment serves no rehabilitative, deterrent, or re-
tributive value for an automatistic defendant. 97 Society generally
imprisons only those who are morally blameworthy, not those who
are unable to control their actions. For these reasons, several Ameri-
can courts have determined that an automaton should not suffer
criminal liability for his or her conduct. 98
American courts might find it equally appropriate to exclude
PMS-induced conduct from the reach of the criminal law. Although
a PMS sufferer may be conscious of her actions and devoid of any
mental disease or defect, she is no more able to control her actions
than the automaton or the legally insane.99 Physiological anomalies
render the PMS sufferer unable to control her actions during the
short time PMS symptoms surface.'°° These symptoms surface, how-
ever, at regular, predictable intervals which doctors can effectively
control under appropriate medical supervision.
If the PMS sufferer is morally blameless, she should not suffer
the stigma and indignity of being branded a criminal. It would
therefore be appropriate to treat PMS as a substantive defense.
94 See, e.g., id.; People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 198 P.2d 865 (1948); People v. Grant, 46
Ill. App. 3d 125, 360 N.E.2d 809 (1977), rev'd on related grounds, 71 Ill. 2d 551, 377 N.E.2d 4
(1978); Corder v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1955); State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266,
215 S.E.2d 348 (1975); Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351 (Okla. Grim. App. 1962).
95 See, e.g., Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 146.
96 Id.
97 Legal scholars generally identify these three values as representative of the traditional
purposes of punishment in the criminal law. See, e.g., S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M.
PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 181-210 (4th ed. 1983).
98 See note 94 supra.
99 This argument was unsuccessfully advanced by Smith on appeal. The court con-
cluded that, under English law, the PMS victim falls "into the grey medical area . . . be-
tween insanity and automatism." LEXIS, supra note 50, at paras. 14-15.
100 See, e.g., Reid & Yen, supra note 6, at 85-86; Sharma, supra note 3, at 1091.
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However, if American courts choose to recognize PMS as a substan-
tive defense, they must ensure the availability of a mechanism to su-
pervise and treat the PMS sufferer. Without such a mechanism, the
courts could not ensure that the PMS sufferer receives the necessary
treatment and that society is protected from future antisocial behav-
ior. Presently, however, such a mechanism is not uniformly avail-
able.10 Furthermore, the development of such a mechanism may be
impeded by the inability of the medical profession to agree on the
definition, cause, and treatment of PMS.
B. PMS and Mitigation
In Craddock, Smith, and English, English courts have recently rec-
ognized PMS as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 10 2 In Smith, the
court explained that by recognizing PMS as a mitigating factor in-
stead of as a substantive defense, a court could retain control over an
individual who may still be a danger to those around her.10 3 A sub-
stantive defense of PMS, on the other hand, would compel the courts
to release a defendant unsupervised, with all of the consequent risks
to society.
Until there is a sufficient mechanism available to eliminate these
risks through supervision and treatment of the PMS sufferer, the law
must choose between respecting the PMS sufferer's moral blameless-
ness and protecting society from further violence and unlawful be-
havior. For the present, mitigation provides a workable compromise
between completely rejecting PMS as a legal issue and recognizing it
as a substantive defense to crime. Furthermore, mitigation allows
courts some flexibility to tailor the PMS sufferer's sentence to the
101 Some states have adopted civil commitment statutes which closely resemble the mech-
anism needed to ensure both the supervised treatment of the PMS sufferer and the protection
of society from future violent acts. Generally, however, these statutes provide only for the
civil commitment of individuals suffering from a mental disease or defect. They do not allow
for the commitment of individuals whose antisocial behavior is caused by physiological disor-
ders such as PMS. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1982) ("When any
person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely
disabled, a peace officer . . . may, upon probable cause, take . . . the person into custody
. . . ."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 330.10 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1982) ("Upon a verdict of not
responsible by reason of mental disease or defect,..." § 330.20 will govern subsequent com-
mitment proceedings.). Other states have adopted more broadly-worded statutes which could
encompass physiological disorders such as PMS. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 /, § 3-607
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) ("When . . . any court has reasonable grounds to believe that a
person appearing before it is subject to involuntary admission and in need of immediate
hospitalization to protect such person or others from physical harm, the court may enter an
order for the temporary detention and examination of such person.").
102 See notes 3 and 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
103 LEXIS, supra note 50, at paras. 16-17.
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degree of her affliction. Mitigation remains inadequate, however, be-
cause it results in labeling the PMS sufferer a criminal, contrary to
her moral blamelessness. Furthermore, to the extent that some courts
might use PMS merely to reduce prison sentences, mitigation is un-
acceptable. The sentence imposed must reflect the need to treat, not
to punish, the PMS sufferer. Under no circumstances should courts
punish a defendant for PMS-induced conduct.
IV. Impediments to the PMS Defense
Several factors may impede both the recognition of PMS by the
American courts and the incorporation of the PMS concept into the
criminal law. These factors include: the differences of opinion
within the medical profession; fears that criminal defendants will
abuse the PMS defense; and concerns that recognition of an exclu-
sively female defense will promote sexism.
As discussed previously, the medical profession's inability to ar-
rive at universally accepted theories on the definition, cause, and
treatment of the premenstrual syndrome has impeded unanimous
recognition of PMS by the legal profession.10 4 Because of this medi-
cal uncertainty, critics caution that the use of PMS as a legal defense
is premature.10 5 To postpone recognition for this reason, however, is
neither fair to women afflicted with PMS nor necessary. In a crimi-
nal case in which the deleterious effects of PMS are well-docu-
mented, the court should receive and consider this evidence.
Furthermore, the law cannot wait until the medical profession
reaches unanimous agreement on the definition, cause, and treat-
ment of PMS. As has been the case with legal insanity, the process of
reaching unanimous agreement might be interminable. Countless
PMS sufferers may have already been unjustly imprisoned because
the law has not yet recognized their disorder.
Additionally, the legal profession should be aware of fears
among the public that all women charged with crimes could escape
liability merely by asserting the PMS defense.'0 6 Such abuse could
exculpate the blameworthy and throw the concept of premenstrual
syndrome into disrepute, potentially forcing women who legitimately
suffer from PMS to go unaided. Even Dr. Dalton has warned that
courts must remain suspicious of women who plead the PMS
104 See text accompanying notes 9-35 supra.
105 See, e.g., Newman, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1982, at 22, col. 6; Clausen,
supra note 6; Tybor, supra note 3, at 17.
106 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 68, at 170; Clausen, supra note 6; Tybor, supra note 3, at
17.
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defense. 07
Members of the medical and legal professions could minimize
the possibility of abuse if they properly perform their respective du-
ties. PMS is a quantifiable, scientifically provable affliction' 018 which
courts should subject to heavy burdens of proof.'0 9 Dr. Dalton pro-
poses that courts require a detailed charting of the woman's men-
strual cycle and a thorough diary of her past symptoms and erratic
behavior. 10 In addition, other experts have recommended that a
successful PMS plea require the expert testimony of both an endocri-
nologist and a psychiatrist.''
The possibility of abuse inheres in many areas of the law. Gen-
erally, American courts have successfully safeguarded against poten-
tial abuses. Because of the quantifiable physical manifestations of
PMS, courts should encounter no problems unique to managing
PMS evidence and detecting spurious claims.
The American legal profession should also be aware of the con-
cerns of many feminists that acceptance of PMS as a legal defense
could lead to an erosion of the advances women have made toward
social equality.,"2  Some feminists reason that throughout history,
men have pointed to the indisposing qualities of the menstrual cycle,
pregnancy, and childbirth to support self-assumed superiority over
women." 3 Recognition of the PMS defense, they reason, would fuel
those prejudices and promote further untenable exploitation of fe-
male physiology., 14
The legal profession must not overemphasize these concerns,
however, and ignore the legitimate needs of PMS sufferers. Women
who commit antisocial acts because PMS rendered them unable to
control their behavior deserve recognition of this fact in the courts.
PMS sufferers require medical attention, not punishment.
107 Tybor, supra note 3, at 17.
108 See, e.g., Henig, supra note 6, at 79, col. 1.
109 See, e.g., K. Dalton, supra note 14, at 1.
110 Id.; Tybor, supra note 3, at 17.
111 Wallach & Rubin, supra note 16, at 234 n.101. For a discussion of the methods of
introducing expert testimony to establish a PMS defense, see Note, Premenstrual Stress Syndrome
As A Defense In Criminal Cases, 1983 DUKE L.J. 176.
112 See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra note 3, at 1396; Recent Development, Premenstrual Syndrome, 6
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 226-27 (1983); Tybor, supra note 3, at 17.
113 See, e.g., Wallach & Rubin, supra note 16, at 210-11; Klemesrud, A Surgeon and Author
Explains His Chauvinism, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1982, at 60, col. 1.
114 Sybil Shainwald, head of the National Women's Health Network, has warned that a
PMS defense could be used to discriminate against women: "To use PMS as a legal defense
would be a giant step backward. It is clearly an anti-feminist move." Henig,supra note 6, at
78, col. 4.
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V. Conclusion
The premenstrual syndrome is a physiological disorder which,
until recently, has been dismissed or trivialized as simply a part of a
woman's lot in life. Today, however, an increasing amount of evi-
dence indicates a causal nexus between PMS and criminal behavior.
Although the legal profession has remained indifferent toward this
disorder in the past, recent decisions indicate a growing trend toward
recognition of PMS in the courts. American courts must develop a
systematic approach to the PMS issue.
We have suggested two approaches which stress the importance
of medical attention for, not punishment of, the PMS sufferer. The
first approach, recognizing PMS as a substantive defense, is desirable
because it acknowledges the PMS sufferer's lack of moral culpability.
This approach would be unwise and inappropriate, however, until
society establishes sufficient means to treat PMS sufferers and ensures
that the public is protected from future PMS-induced violent behav-
ior. Presently, however, no such mechanism exists. The second ap-
proach, recognizing PMS in mitigation, enables the courts to retain
control over the PMS sufferer and supervise the necessary treatment.
However, because mitigation fails to acknowledge the PMS sufferer's
moral blamelessness, some courts might use mitigation to reduce
prison sentences instead of ordering medical supervision. Mitigation
is an appropriate approach only insofar as the courts use it to super-
vise medical treatment of the PMS sufferer.
Although compelling reasons suggest delaying acceptance of the
PMS defense until the medical profession reaches a consensus as to
the precise cause of PMS, such a consensus may not be readily forth-
coming. In the meantime, countless PMS sufferers may be punished
for acts over which they had no control. The American legal system
must incorporate the PMS concept into the criminal law to avoid
this injustice.
Robert Mark Carny
Brian D. Williams*
* The authors researched and wrote this comment while studying at The University of Notre Dame
Concannon Programme of International Law in London. We wish to thank Mr. Keith Evans for his
generous contributions to our research. Mr. Evans represented Sandie (Craddock) Smith at trial and on
appeal He is both a barrister at London's Gray's Inn and a member of the California bar.
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LABOR LAW-LIMITING AN EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR FIRING A
SUPERVISOR FOR UNION ACTIVITY
In 1982 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the
Board) overturned fifteen years of precedent by deciding in Parker-
Robb Chevrolet, Inc.,I that an employer does not violate section 8(a) (1)
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) 2 when the
employer discharges a supervisor as an integral part of a pattern of
conduct designed to curtail union activities among protected em-
ployees. In a number of decisions before Parker-Robb, the NLRB had
held that the discharge of a supervisor by an employer as part of a
pattern of conduct aimed at coercing employees in the exercise of
their section 7 rights constituted a violation of the Act.3
In reaching its decision in Parker-Robb, the NLRB determined
that the critical inquiry when deciding whether the firing of a super-
visor violated the Act was not whether the employer intended to in-
timidate employees by the firing, but rather whether the firing
interfered with the right of employees to exercise their own rights
under the Act.4 The Board's decision rested on a determination to
implement the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act's
(LMRA) specific exclusion of supervisors from protection, despite the
union's argument. The union argued that the "pattern of conduct"
cases helped to implement the NLRA's prohibition of unfair labor
practices by employers against employees. 5 Recently the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld
1 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. (1982). See also 110 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1982).
2 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA reads:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer: (1) to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). See also note 19 infra.
3 The historical development of the rule can be seen in the following cases: Pioneer
Drilling Co., Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 918 (1967), enforced in materialpart, 391 F.2d 961 (10th Cir.
1968); Krebs & King Toyota, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 462 (1972); Fairview Nursing Home, 202
N.L.R.B. 318, enforced mem., 486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974);
Production Stamping, 239 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1979); Nevis Industries, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1053
(1979), enforcement denied in material part, 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981); Downslope Industries,
Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 948 (1979), enforced, 676 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1982); DRW Corp., 248
N.L.R.B. 828 (1980); Sheraton Puerto Rico Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 867 (1980), enforcement denied,
651 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1981). See also note 19 infra.
4 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 9. See also note 43 infra and accompanying text.
5 Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. N.L.R.B., No. 82-2264, slip op. at 2 (D.C.
Cir. June 30, 1983). See also note 37 infra and accompanying text. Some restrictions on the
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the Board's decision,6 and subsequent cases have applied Parker-Robb
with little discussion or analysis.7 But Parker-Robb and these subse-
quent cases have left several questions unanswered, including
whether an employer's intent may still be a factor in determining
whether the firing of a supervisor violates the NLRA.
Part I of this recent decision traces the history of the NLRB's
protection of supervisors. Part II discusses the Parker-Robb decision,
and Part III suggests some possible ramifications of the NLRB's deci-
sion to abandon fifteen years of labor law.
I. Historical Background
The Taft-Hartley Act (the Labor Management Relations Act or
LMRA)8 altered the status and the protection that the National La-
bor Relations Act (the NLRA) 9 had previously afforded supervisors.
Before Congress passed the LMRA, supervisors were not specifically
excluded from the NLRA's definition of employee, 10 and the NLRB
had recognized and protected supervisors' rights to organize and to
bargain collectively." The Supreme Court had upheld the Board's
position protecting supervisors' rights to organize and bargain in
ability of an employer to fire a supervisor still remain, and rank-and-file employees are still
protected. See notes 22-25 infra and accompanying text.
6 Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. N.L.R.B., No. 82-2264 (D.C. Cir. June
30, 1983).
7 See Sorrento Hotel, 266 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 112 L.R.R.M. 1358 (1983); Sahara-Reno
Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 110 L.R.R.M. 1544 (1982); Master Food Services, Inc., 262
N.L.R.B. No. 105, 110 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1982); Roma Baking Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 110
L.R.R.M. 1523 (1982); Rain-Ware, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 111 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1982);
Boro Management Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 111 L.R.R.M. 1029 (1982); Seven-Up Bot-
tling, 263 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 111 L.R.R.M. 1060 (1982); Serendippity-Un-Ltd., 263 N.L.R.B.
No. 100, 111 L.R.R.M. 1263 (1982); Campbell-Harris Electric, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 167,
111 L.R.R.M. 1492 (1982); Bentley Hedges Travel Service, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 111
L.R.R.M. 1238 (1982); Valley Mart Supermarkets, 264 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 111 L.R.R.M. 1299
(1982); Gurabo Lace Mills, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 112 L.R.R.M. 1276 (1982).
8 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120,
61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976)).
9 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
10 This definition read:
(3) The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in con-
nection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment,
but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed
by his parent or spouse.
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935).
11 See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14 (1947),repifntedin 1 N.L.R.B. LEG-
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Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B. 2 In some cases, however, the super-
visors' unions were connected to the unions of rank-and-file employ-
ees. 13 This situation created both a conflict of interest for supervisors
and an uneasiness among employers.
Declaring that the recognition of supervisors' unions was "incon-
sistent with the purpose" 14 of the NLRA, Congress in the LMRA
specifically excluded supervisors from the definition of employee1 5
and included a new definition of supervisor. 16 The change was neces-
sary, Congress stated, in order to ensure that goods flowed smoothly
through the marketplace, that employees' activities were not con-
trolled or disrupted by supervisors, and that management had loyal
supervisors who were free of conflicts of interest.1 7
The LMRA gave rights to supervisors, but it also stripped them
of protection the NLRA had previously provided. Supervisors re-
tained the right to join unions, but employers were not required to
regard union activities among supervisors as protected. 8 Supervisors
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 304-05 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as 1 N.L.R.B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
12 330 U.S. 485 (1947). The Court reasoned:
Though the foreman is the faithful representative of the employer in maintaining a
production schedule, his interest properly may be adverse to that of the employer
when it comes to fixing his own wages, hours, seniority rights or working conditions.
He does not lose his right to serve himself in these respects because he serves his
master in others. And we see no basis in this Act whatever for holding that foremen
are forbidden the protection of the Act when they take collective action to protect
their collective interest.
Id. at 489-90. Working under a "circumscribed" standard of review, the Court affirmed the
Board. Id. at 491.
13 See, e.g., Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942); Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44
N.L.R.B. 874 (1942); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 415 (1955).
14 1 N.L.R.B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 305.
15 See note l0supra for the prior definition. Congress, in drafting the LMRA, deleted the
period and added ", or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to
the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
16 This definition reads:
(11) The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the inter-
est of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or cleri-
cal nature, but reouires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). For a discussion of the evolution of this definition, see 1 N.L.R.B.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 539.
17 1 N.L.R.B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 305-07.
18 The LMRA added this provision:
(a) Supervisors as union members
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were thus. denied the protection of sections 719 and 8(a)(1) 20 of the
NLRA. Employers could therefore discharge supervisors for union
activities without committing an unfair ltbor practice.2 1
In spite of this exclusion, the NLRB recognized, and continues
to recognize, that under certain circumstances the firing of a supervi-
sor could violate section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. These circumstances
include firing a supervisor (1) for testifying at an NLRB hearing or
otherwise participating in the processing of a grievance,2 2 (2) for re-
fusing to commit an unfair labor practice 2 3 (3) for failing to prevent
unionization 2 4 and (4) as a pretext for dismissing the supervisor's
pro-union crew. 25 In these circumstances supervisors are protected
under section 8(a)(1), even though they are not statutory employ-
ees. 26 Under all of these circumstances, however, the NLRB stated
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from
becoming or remaining a member of this labor organization, but no employer sub-
ject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as
supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relat-
ing to collective bargaining.
29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976).
19 Section 7 reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
20 See note 2 supra.
21 The Supreme Court supported this position. See, e.g., Beasley v. Food Fair of North
Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974) (holding that § 164(a) applies to federal, state, and local
laws, and that a supervisor may be dismissed for union activity).
22 See, e.g., Oil City Brass Works, 147 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964), enforced, 357 F.2d 466 (5th Cir.
1966) (an employer violated § 8(a)(1) by firing a supervisor who had testified at an N.L.R.B.
hearing); Rohr Industries, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1975) (a supervisor was terminated for
signing a statement used in an employee's grievance process).
23 See, e.g., Gerry's Cash Markets, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1141 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1021
(lst Cir. 1979) (a supervisor was dismissed for refusing to commit the unfair labor practice of
enforcing an invalid no-solicitation rule); Belcher Towing Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 446 (1978), en-
forced, 614 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1980)(same).
24 See, e.g., Talladega Cotton Factory, 106 N.L.R.B. 295 (1953), enforced; 213 F.2d 209
(5th Cir. 1954) (supervisors were dismissed for failing to prevent the unionization of a mill).
25 See, e.g., Pioneer Drilling Co., Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 918 (1967), enforced in materialpart, 391
F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1968) (two supervisors were dismissed as a pretext for dismissing their
pro-union crews); Downslope Industries, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 948 (1979), enforced, 676 F.2d 1114
(6th Cir. 1982) (a supervisor's dismissal was part of the employer's plan to curtail concerted
activities).
26 "Statutory employees" are employees as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). See
notes 10 and 15 supra.
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that its goal was not to extend statutory protection to supervisors, but
rather to insure that rank-and-file employees were not deprived of
their section 7 rights through indirect coercion of their supervisors.
By recognizing and enforcing these exceptions, the NLRB refused to
allow employers to coerce statutory employees into curtailing union
activities by making an example of a supervisor. 27
Prior to the Parker-Robb decision, the NLRB also recognized that
an employer violated section 8(a)(1) if he discharged a supervisor,
who had participated in union activities, as an integral part of a pat-
tern of conduct designed to discourage union activities among statu-
tory employees. 28 The NLRB determined that the discharge of a
supervisor was an unfair labor practice if the employer intended the
firing to coerce statutory employees to curtail union activities.2 9 As
with the other exceptions, the NLRB's ultimate goal in the pattern of
conduct cases was to protect the rights of statutory employees. Thus
when the Board considered whether or not the firing of a supervisor
violated 8(a)(1), the extent of the supervisor's involvement in the pro-
tected activities was less important than the employer's motivation
for firing the supervisor. 30 If the employer intended to discourage
27 See Annot., 50 A.L.R. FED. 866 (1980).
28 The seminal case in this area of NLRB policy is Pioneer Drilling Co., Inc., 162
N.L.R.B. 918 (1967), enforced zn materialpart, 391 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1968), in which the firing
of two pro-union supervisors violated § 8(a)(1) because, due to industry customs, it resulted in
the dismissal of the supervisors' pro-union crews. See also note 3 supra.
29 See Brod, The NLRB in Search of a Standard- When Is the Discharge of a Supervisor in Connec-
tion With Employees' Union or Other Protected Activities an Unfair Labor Practice?, 14 IND. L.R. 727,
738 (1981).
30 These cases became increasingly difficult to distinguish from cases in which a supervi-
sor had been legitimately discharged. See Brod, supra note 29, at 732-38. Brod summarizes
the situation this way:
Although many decisions since Pioneer Drilling have resulted in a finding that
the discharge of a supervisor violated section 8(a)(1) there have been many cases
where the Board has rejected the contention that such a discharge was illegal. In
these cases, the supervisor's discharge was held not to violate section 8(a) (1) for one
or more of the following reasons: the supervisor sided with employees in their eco-
nomic dispute with the employer; the supervisor engaged in union activities or
other conduct inconsistent with his status; the employer did not embark on a pat-
tern of misconduct aimed at rank-and-file employees; or the supervisor's discharge
did not have the adverse impact on the employees' exercise of statutory rights pro-
scribed by section 8(a)(1). These cases are not surprising because they follow from
the majority's view that the employer's motivation (generally shown by the context
in which the supervisor's discharge occurred) is the determinant of the legality of
the supervisor's discharge under the 'integral part of a pattern of misconduct'
rationale.
Id. at 737-38 (footnotes omitted).
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union activity among statutory employees by the firing, the firing
violated 8(a)(1), or it did until Parker-Robb.
II. Parker-Robb: Fifteen Years of Precedent Notwithstanding
In Parker-Robb, the NLRB overruled the pattern of conduct line
of cases, finding them incompatible with the LMRA's statutory ex-
clusion of supervisors.31 In Parker-Robb, a number of auto salesmen,
along with two of their supervisors, attended a union organizational
meeting. At the meeting the supervisors were told they were not eligi-
ble to join the union. Subsequently, some of the employees were
fired, allegedly for economic reasons. Two of them immediately in-
formed their sales crew chief, Terry Doss, of their discharge. Doss
was one of the two supervisors who had attended the organizational
meeting. Doss angrily questioned Parker-Robb's used car sales man-
ager, and then the new car sales manager, about the reason for the
discharges. Both told him that the firings were for economic reasons.
Finally, when Doss persisted in demanding an explanation, he too
was discharged. 32Z
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the supervi-
sor's discharge was part of a pattern of conduct intended to coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to union or concerted activ-
ity. Thus, following previous Board precedent, 33 the ALJ found that
the discharge violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and ordered the su-
pervisor's reinstatement. 34 On appeal, the NLRB found that the dis-
charge was indeed part of such a pattern of conduct. 35 However, the
Board also found that the line of cases upon which the ALJ based his
decision had been incorrectly decided. Consequently, the NLRB
overruled these precedents, and reversed the ALJ's decision on this
point.36 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit recently denied a petition for review of the Board's
31 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
32 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 2.
33 Specifically, the Board relied upon DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 828 (1980). See also
cases cited in note 3 supra.
34 The ALJ also found the employees' discharges to have been unlawful. Accordingly, he
ordered their reinstatement. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 11.
35 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 1 n. 1. Member Howard Jenkins, Jr. concurred in the
result. However, he maintained that there was insufficient evidence that Doss had been dis-
charged for concerted activity. Consequently, he argued that Parker-Robb did not present for
review the principle enunciated in the pattern of conduct cases. Id. at 18-20.
36 Id. at 10. The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision regarding the employees. See note 34
suPra.
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decision. 37
At first blush, the Board's reasoning appears straightforward
and simple. Supervisors are expressly excluded, through the LMRA,
from the Act's protection. Therefore, the discharge of a supervisor
may violate the Act only in those exceptional circumstances where
that discharge also directly affects employees' rights. For example,
the discharge of a supervisor for his adverse testimony at a hearing is
unlawful because it impinges upon the rights of employees to have
their grievances heard. 38 Similarly, in the Pioneer Drilling-type situa-
tion,39 the discharge of a supervisor is merely a pretext for the dis-
charge of his own pro-union crew. The supervisor's discharge is thus
unlawful, since it effectively denies the employees their rights to en-
gage in union activity.40
In contrast, in Parker-Robb the NLRB determined that the dis-
charge of a supervisor for his own union or concerted activity has
only an "incidental or secondary effect on the employees."' 41 The
Board reasoned that since employees are statutorily protected from
reprisal for engaging in similar activities they should not be intimi-
dated by the example. Accordingly, the Board found that this type
37 Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. N.L.R.B., No. 82-2264, slip op. at 2 (D.C.
Cir. June 30, 1983). The court of appeals' opinion is very straightforward. The court noted
that its standard of review was quite narrow, i.e., that it must enforce the Board's construc-
tion so long as it was "reasonably defensible." The court summarized its analysis as follows:
Petitioner argues that the 'pattern of conduct' line of cases properly implements the
Act's prohibition of unfair labor practices by employers against employees. The
Board responds that it is necessary to overturn that line of cases to implement the
Act's specific exclusion of supervisors from protection. Given that Congress has not
indicated which interpretation it intended, that the courts have allowed the Board
broad discretion in applying the general provisions of the Act to specific situations,
that the Board's application of those provisions to this case is a reasonable exercise
of that discretion, and that the Board has adequately explained its reasons for re-
versing its policy, we deny the petition for review.
Id. at 2.
38 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
39 Pioneer Drilling Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 918 (1967), enforced in material part, 391 F.2d 961
(10th Cir. 1968). In Pioneer Drilling, two driller/supervisors were fired, purportedly for refus-
ing to accept transfers. Each of their respective crews was attempting to organize a union.
The NLRB found that in the drilling industry it was customary for each driller to hire his
own crew. The crew remained employed only so long as its driller was employed. Conse-
quently, the Board found that the discharge of the drillers was merely a ploy to discharge
their pro-union crews. The Board therefore ordered reinstatement.
40 See note 25 supra and accompanying text. In addition, the NLRB noted in Parker-Robb
that the unlawfulness of discharging a supervisor for refusing to commit an unfair labor prac-
tice prevents even those employees who are not protected by the Act from being "coerced into
violating the law." 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 9.
41 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 9.
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of discharge does not violate the Act.42
In reaching its decision that Parker-Robb's discharge of a super-
visor did not violate the NLRA, the Board employed a test under
which the critical inquiry in determining whether a supervisor's dis-
charge violates the Act is whether the discharge has a direct effect on
employees' rights.43 Prior to Parker-Robb, the NLRB's inquiry in such
cases focused on whether or not the employer intended to stifle em-
ployee rights by the firing of a supervisor. 44 Thus, under Parker-Robb,
[I]t is irrelevant that an employer may have hoped, or even ex-
pected, that its decision to terminate a supervisor for his union or
concerted activity would cause employees to reconsider. . . their
own concerted or union activity. No matter what the employer's
subjective hope or expectation, that circumstance cannot change
the character of its otherwise lawful conduct.4 5
It is clear that the Board's decision in Parker-Robb is predicated
upon a fundamental shift in philosophy. As discussed below, the
Board's analysis of effect versus intent does not adequately support
its distinction between types of supervisor discharges. Rather, the
Board's holding is better understood simply as a new, bright line
distinction.
The Board claims to differentiate between lawful and unlawful
supervisor discharges according to their effect upon employees. But
these effects are never measured. There is no provision for weighing,
on a case by case basis, the actual effects of a given discharge upon
given employees. Rather, the effects of each type of discharge are
defined apriori. Thus, it is presumed that the effects upon employees
of a discharge for adverse testimony, for example, are always greater
than the effects of a discharge for concerted activity. Situations
where the opposite would be true are not difficult to imagine. For
instance, if a given group of statutory employees were unaware of the
distinction the LMRA makes between supervisors and employees,
the discharge of a supervisor for concerted activity might actua~ly
have a great effect on their own willingness to engage in concerted
activity. Similarly, the discharge of a supervisor for adverse testi-
42 Id.
43 Id. at 10. The Board stated that the critical inquiry in supervisor discharge cases is
whether the discharge "interferes with the right of employees to exercise their rights under
Section 7 of the Act." Id. See also note 19 supra.
44 Set, e.g., DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 828 (1980); Downslope Industries, Inc., 246
N.L.R.B. 948 (1979), enforced, 676 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1982); Nevis Industries, Inc., 246
N.L.R.B. 1053 (1979), enforcement denied in materialpart, 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981).
45 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 9.
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mony might actuall. have a very small effect on employees' rights-
particularly where the value of his testimony is slight. Yet, under
Parker-Robb, the effects of this latter type of discharge would be pre-
sumed to be greater than those of the former.4 6 Judgment would be
entered accordingly.
The Board also claims to propound an objective test which will
obviate the subjective inquiry into whether or not an employer in-
tended to coerce his employees by the discharge of a supervisor. But
what of those cases where the situation is ambiguous and it is unclear
whether a supervisor was lawfully discharged in retaliation for con-
certed activity, or unlawfully discharged for some other reason?
How should the ambiguity be resolved? Since the relative effects of
each type of discharge are already defined at fixed levels, the ques-
tion would appear to turn on the employer's motive. Against which
supervisory activity did the employer intend to retaliate? Concerted
activity? Then the discharge is lawful. Adverse testimony? Then
the discharge is unlawful. Parker-Robb has not eliminated the ques-
tion of intent, but merely shifted it.
At least one decision subsequent to Parker-Robb has noted the
intent issue. In Humana of West Virginia, Inc .,47 a head nurse was fired,
admittedly for union activity. The ALJ, following Parker-Robb, held
that this was lawful. The ALJ also found, however, that the em-
ployer had impliedly requested that the nurse question her subordi-
nates about their union activities-an unfair labor practice-and
that she was fired for refusing to do so. 48 The ALJ ordered her rein-
stated. The Board reversed this finding, stating that the evidence
was insufficient to establish that the employer had an unlawful mo-
tive.4 9 The Board did not, however, flinch at the question of motive.
Indeed, the Board stated that had the evidence established an unac-
ceptable motive on the part of the employer, the case clearly would
have fallen within a recognized exception.50
The new test which the NLRB enunciated in Parker-Robb neither
really measures the effect of the discharge, nor necessarily eliminates
46 Id. at 8-9. The Board's determination that the effects of a discharge for concerted
activity are "incidental or secondary," while the effects of other types of discharges are pre-
sumably "primary," is equally unhelpful. It assumes that all secondary effects are necessarily
less coercive than are primary ones.
47 265 N.L.R.B. No. 126, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,484 (1982).
48 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
49 265 N.L.R.B. No. 126, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,484 at
26,356 (1982).
50 Id.
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the question of intent. Instead, it simply makes a new, bright line
distinction between types of supervisor discharges. What was the
Board's motive for making the change? Perhaps it was pragmatic.
As the Board points out, some of the previous decisions which ap-
plied the subjective standard were not without difficulty.5 1 More
probably, however, it was a deliberate effort to draw "a new line
between the employee's and employer's rights that attempts to ac-
commodate both. ' 52 That is, the Board may have sought deliber-
ately to give more emphasis to the employer's right to demand
loyalty from his supervisors.
III. Ramifications of Parker-Robb
The Board has not yet wavered from the new guidelines an-
nounced in Parker-Robb, and any reconsideration seems unlikely, at
least for the present time.53 All the future ramifications are not yet
clear. But, the consequences to supervisors and employees are seri-
ous; employers, however, benefit from the Parker-Robb guidelines.
Supervisors will be afforded less protection under the new guide-
lines. While Parker-Robb took no statutory protection away from su-
pervisors, it eliminated, without warning, what had been for fifteen
years a recognized exception to an employer's power to dismiss a su-
pervisor for his participation in union activities. 54 Although this
remedy for supervisors is gone, the Board's goal of protecting the
rights of statutory employees remains. These employees should get
some assurance that their right to engage in union activities is pro-
tected. Rank-and-file employees may not realize that supervisors
have no statutory protection, and they may fear for their own secur-
ity if their rights are not explained. Employers who fire supervisors
for engaging in union activities should be required to notify employ-
ees that they cannot be fired for similar activities. Otherwise, em-
ployers may effectively curtail union activities among statutory
employees simply by firing a supervisor.
51 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 8 n.15.
52 Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. N.L.R.B., No. 82-2264, slip op. at 8 (D.C.
Cir. June 30, 1983).
53 The current makeup of the Board renders any reconsideration unlikely. Member
Howard Jenkins, Jr., who registered the only reservation in Parker-Robb, no longer sits on the
Board.
54 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit states plainly
that the "issue is the Board's decision to overturn fifteen years of precedent." Automobile
Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. N.L.R.B., No. 82-2264, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. June 30,
1983).
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If supervisors now need any protection, they must rely solely on
the exceptions to an employer's ability to dismiss a supervisor that
are still recognized and enforced by the Board.55 These protections
remain since the circumstances underlying the exceptions are pre-
sumed to have a coercive effect on the activities of statutory employ-
ees. Because Parker-Robb eliminated the pattern of conduct
exception, aggrieved supervisors will likely resort to the remaining
exceptions more often in the future. In particular, they may try to
assert that they were dismissed for refusing to commit an unfair labor
practice or for failing to prevent unionization. 56 The standard for
determining whether a particular fact situation fits into one of these
exceptions is unclear. The standard may be the actual coercive effect
achieved on the employees' activities by the employer through firing
the supervisor, or it may be the employer's intent to achieve a coer-
cive effect on the employees' activities by firing the supervisor, re-
gardless of whether that effect is in fact achieved.57
Parker-Robb has not yet been thoroughly analyzed and applied
by the NLRB or courts. However, the Board's decision to reverse a
liberal interpretation of the law may indicate a trend toward a nar-
row reading and interpretation of the law in the area of employer-
supervisor relations. 58 If so, the balance of power will swing further
toward employers.
Kevin J. Hasson
Cystal L. Miller
55 See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
56 Realistically, practitioners seeking relief for their aggrieved clients will have little
choice but to rely on these remaining exceptions.
57 Humana of West Virginia, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1982), [1982-83 Transfer
Binder] NLRB Dec. (CCH) 115,484, raises the possibility that the employer's intent may still
be an issue. See note 49 supra and acompanying text.
58 See, e.g., Comet Fast Freight, 262 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 110 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1982), in
which the Board held that a truck driver's dismissal did not violate § 8(a)(1) because his
complaint about an unsafe truck did not constitute concerted activity. Board Member Jen-
kins expressed reservations (as he did in Parker-Robb), asserting that the Board was reversing
precedent. For a fuller discussion of this precedent, see id. at 1321-23 nn.3-5, 12-14.
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TORT LAW-THE ENLARGING SCOPE OF AUDITORS' LIABILITY TO
RELYING THIRD PARTIES
"If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder
. . . may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 1 With
this statement in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 2 Judge Cardozo limited
accountants' liability for negligence to only those persons in privity
of contract with the auditor. While Uliramares was strong precedent
for many years and is still followed in a number of jurisdictions,3 the
Ultramares privity limitation has been criticized by both courts4 and
legal commentators. 5 Those courts which have rejected Ultramares
have generally accepted some variant of the Restatement's position
which permits recovery for only those plaintiffs who are actually fore-
seen.6 A new standard may be emerging, however. In two 1983 deci-
1 Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
2 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
3 See, e.g., Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhold, Krekstien, Horwath
& Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App.
367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973); Dworman v. Lee, 83 A.D.2d 507, 441 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1981), affd
without opinion, 56 N.Y.2d 816, 438 N.E.2d 103, 452 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
4 See cases cited in note 6 infra.
5 Bessler, Pitvity?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 507, 516-17 (1976); Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third
Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 838, 843 (1977); Seavy, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts,
39 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 48-49 (1939); Wiener, Common Law Liability of CerfisfedpUblic Accountants
for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 249 (1983); Comment, Accountant's
Liability for Negligence. A Contemporaqy Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV.
401, 416 (1980)
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1981) provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business [or] profession . .. supplies false infor-
mation for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liabil-
ity for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) [T]he liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the per-
son or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends
to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b)
through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influ-
ence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
See, e.g., Haddon View Investment Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154,436 N.E.2d
212 (1982); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977);
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Ryan v. Kanne,
170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968)
(applying Rhode Island state law); Annot., 46 A.L.R. 3d 979, 1001 (1972).
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sions, H Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler 7 and Citizens State Bank v. Timm,
Schmidt & Co. ,8 New Jersey and Wisconsin departed from both the
Ultramares privity requirement and the Restatement position and ap-
plied standards based on foreseeability. By eliminating the anachro-
nistic privity barrier, the Wisconsin and New Jersey Supreme Courts
have drawn accountants' liability for negligence in their states in line
with that of other negligent tortfeasors.
This comment, in Part I, discusses the privity defense in the con-
text of auditors' liability and the recent trend away from recognizing
this defense. Part II presents the two recent decisions in which state
supreme courts departed from the Ultramares rule. Finally, Part III
examines the policy justifications for these recent decisions and con-
trasts them with those of Ultramares and its progeny.
I. The Defense of Privity: An Historical Perspective
The common law defense of privity of contract originated in
1848 in Winterbottom v. Wright in which the court limited recovery for
negligence to the contracting parties.9 The defense survived un-
touched for years, but in 1916, the New York Court of Appeals, in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. , 0 undercut the privity defense, holding
that the defense was unavailable to a manufacturer of defective prod-
ucts. Six years later, the New York Court of Appeals, in Glanzer v.
Shepard,'1 again addressed the privity issue. In Glanzer, a bean seller
hired the defendant, a public weigher, to certify the weight of 905
bags of beans that were to be sold to the plaintiff.'2 The defendants
7 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
8 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
9 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). In Winterbottom, the defendant contracted with the postal
service to maintain the coaches in a safe and secure condition. Id. at 402. The plaintiff, a
mail coach driver, suffered personal injury when his coach broke down due to the defendant's
negligent repair. Id. at 402-03. The court disallowed recovery because the plaintiff was not a
party to the contract. It feared that extending liability beyond the contracting parties would
allow the "most absurd, and outrageous consequences" to ensue. Id. at 405.
10 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In MacPherson, the New York Court of Appeals
held the manufacturer of a defective automobile liable in negligence to the ultimate user of
the automobile. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. The defendant claimed that its liability for
negligence extended only to the retail dealer with whom it had contracted, and not to that
dealer's customers. Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, discarded the notion that liability
for negligence flows exclusively from the contract: "We have put aside the notion that the
duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows
out of contract and nothing else." Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053. Therefore, at least with
regard to personal injury torts, the negligent tortfeasor's liability extends beyond those in
privity of contract. His duty extends to the foreseeable plaintiff.
11 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
12 Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275.
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negligently overstated the weight of the beans; consequently, the
plaintiff overpaid. 13 Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, per-
mitted the plaintiff to recover in spite of the lack of contractual priv-
ity. The court noted that the defendant had a duty to the buyer as
well as the seller, because the buyer's use of the weight certificate was
the "end aim of the transaction."' 14 The court thus expanded liabil-
ity in two ways: first, the court imposed liability for purely economic
loss and second, imposed that liability on a third party not in privity
with the contracting parties.
With decisions like Mac~herson and Glanzer shattering the protec-
tive shield of privity, the accounting profession feared the worst as
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche proceeded through the New York courts.
In Ultramares, the Fred Stern Co. had retained the accounting firm
Touche Niven to prepare audited financial statements.' 5 Although
the statements reported a substantial surplus, Stern Co. was actually
insolvent.' 6  Ultramares Corporation, relying on the inaccurate
financial statements, loaned money to Stern Co. When unable to
collect on the loans, Ultramares sued Touche Niven for negligence
and fraud. The trial court dismissed Ultramares' fraud claim. After
a jury verdict for Ultramares, however, the court also dismissed the
negligence claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of
the fraud claim, but reinstated the jury verdict on the negligence
claim. 17 After it had circumvented the privity barrier in MA'acPherson
and Glanzer, the New York Court of Appeals, in Ultramares, unexpect-
edly absolved the accountants of any liability for negligence to rely-
ing third parties, saying that "[i]f liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery
beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class."18
In Ultramares, the plaintiff relied upon Glanzer to support his ar-
13 Id.
14 Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275. Because the plaintiff's identity was known to the con-
tracting parties, the court, as an alternative basis for supporting its holding, analogized the
situation to that in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). In Lawrence, the intended third
party beneficiary of a contract recovered from the breaching party. 233 N.Y. at 241, 135 N.E.
at 277.
15 255 N.Y. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
16 Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442.
17 Id. at 171, 174 N.E. at 442.
18 Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. This language of Cardozo in Ultramares is similar to that of
Lord Abinger in Winterbottom. Curiously, Cardozo mentioned but ignored Wiznerbottom's ra-
tionale in MacPherson. 217 N.Y. at 392-93, 111 N.E. at 1054.
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gument that liability for negligent words extends to foreseeable recip-
ients, regardless of contractual privity. In rejecting this argument,
the UItramares court distinguished Glanzer, noting that the negligent
weigher in Glanzer supplied information to the bean seller and the
bean purchaser, which was the "end aim of the transaction." In con-
trast, the, public accountants in Ultramares delivered the report only
to their client for use "in the operation of its business as occasion
might require."' 9 Therefore, the court found the two cases clearly
distinguishable: Glanzer involved a foreseen user of the report, while
Ultramares involved one of many foreseeable users. 20
The court posited two policy reasons for relieving accountants of
liability for negligence. The court's first and overriding concern was
that, if held liable for negligence, accountants would be exposed to
enormous financial liability based not on the culpability of their er-
ror, but on the extent to which the erroneous reports were circu-
lated.2' This concern was undoubtedly valid at that time. Public
accounting was not the multi-national, multi-million dollar industry
that it is today,22 but rather a weak, fledgling profession. 23 Also,
given the status of the industry and the state of the law in 1922,
accountants probably could not procure malpractice insurance. The
court's second, and less convincing, policy consideration was their de-
sire to punish fraud (intentional misrepresentation) more severely
than negligent misrepresentation. According to Cardozo, imposing
liability on the accountant in negligence would make negligence
nearly coterminous with fraud.24
Neither of these reasons are valid today. First, an accounting
firm can plan for future liability; malpractice insurance is readily ob-
tainable and commonplace. Moreover, as with product-liability in-
19 255 N.Y. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
20 This distinction has been adopted in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. See note 6
supra and accompanying text.
21 255 N.Y. at 179, 179 N.E. at 444.
22 Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Pub/ic Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REV. 797, 797
(1959); see generally, J. CAREY, I THE RISE OF THE AccOUNTING PROFESSION (1969). One
commentator has remarked:
"The accounting profession today needs little sympathy and should be treated as
any other business. Price, Waterhouse & Co., for example, earned gross income in
the United States of over $200 million in each of the five years [preceding 1979]. Its
worldwide revenue grew from nearly $400 million in 1975 to $635 million in 1979."
Comment, Accountants' Liability for Negligence.- A Contemporary Approach for a Modern Profession, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 413 n.75 (1980); Comment, Accountants' Liability for Compilation and
Review Engagements, 60 TEX. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1982).
23 See Wiener, supra note 5, at 236.
24 255 N.Y. at 185, 174 N.E. at 447.
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surance, society as a whole, rather than accounting firms, carries the
burden of malpractice insurance through increased product costs at-
tributable to a firm's insurance premiums. Second, although the
court's desire to punish intentional wrongdoers more severely than
negligent wrongdoers is a viable concern, imposing additional, puni-
tive damages on the intentional wrongdoer is a better solution. After
all, the third party's pecuniary loss is the same whatever of the nature
of the tortfeasor's conduct.
Regardless of the validity of its policy arguments today, the U-
tramares decision became the leading authority on the negligence lia-
bility of accountants to third parties. 25 The Ultramares decision may
also be partly responsible for the judicial limitation of accountants'
liability under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.26 Section 14A of
that act authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to pro-
mulgate rules pertaining to proxy solicitation.27 Rule 14a-9, promul-
gated pursuant to that authority, forbids proxy solicitations which
contain false or misleading facts or omit material facts that would
make the proxy statement not misleading. 28 Since 1964, when the
United States Supreme Court implied a private cause of action based
on Rule 14a-929, injured shareholders have brought several cases
against officers and directors of corporations.3 0 In these cases, courts
have uniformly held that the plaintiff need only show negligence by
the defendant officer or director, not an intent to deceive. 3 1 Yet in
the single case brought under Rule 14a-9 against public accountants,
Adans v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. ,32 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit required that the plaintiff prove scienter in
25 H Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d at 144. "Whether due to the compelling logic of
the holding, the status of Cardozo, concern for the fledgling profession of accountancy, or a
combination of each, the Ultramares holding remained intact for many years in every jurisdic-
tion where the issue was raised." Wiener, supra note 5, at 236. See also Mess, supra note 5, at
842; Comment, Accountants' Liability for Fake and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 1437, 1439 (1967); Comment, Negligence or Scienter- The Appropriate Standard of Liability for
Outside Accountants for Misleading Proxy Statements Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of.1931, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 437, 457 (1982).
26 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
27 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
28 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1980).
29 J. J. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
30 See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Comment, The Proper
Standard or Fault for Imposing Personal Liability on Corporate Directors for False and Misleading State-
ments in Proxy Solicitation under Section 14(a) of the of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC
Rule 14a-9, 34 OHIO ST. L. J. 670 (1973).
31 Gould, 535 F.2d at 777, Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1299.
32 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1980).
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order to recover.3 3 The court justified its decision by, among other
reasons, the lack of privity between the accountant and the stock-
holders and the potential "enormous" liability for "relatively minor
mistakes" to which a negligence standard would subject account-
ants.3 4 Although the court did not specifically mention Ultramares in
its opinion, these policy considerations echo Cardozo in Ultramares.
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin 35 illustrates the Restatement position,
the most frequently encountered alternative to the Ultramares privity
doctrine.3 6 In Rusch Factors, the United States District Court of
Rhode Island adopted the Restatement position and extended ac-
countants' liability for negligence to "actually foreseen" users, or
members of an actually foreseen limited class of users.37 In Rusch Fac-
tors the defendant prepared audited financial statements for his cli-
ent, knowing that the reports would be supplied to the plaintiff.38
Since reporting to the plaintiff was the "end aim of the transaction,"
the court analogized the case to Glatzer.39 The Rusch Factors court
criticized the Ultramares holding for forcing the innocent reliant party
to "carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional mal-
practice." 4° Extending the circle of liability for accountants' negli-
gence beyond the bastion of privity, the court argued, would
stimulate improved accounting techniques and force accounting
firms to insure against such liability. Ultimately, this insurance cost
would be passed on to their clients in the form of higher fees, thereby
more fairly distributing the risk.4'
On one hand adopting the Restatement position is commenda-
ble inasmuch as it represents a step away from the antiquated privity
defense. Yet, on the other hand, one must question the wisdom of
33 Id. at 428.
34 Id. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court, in Ernst &Ernst a. Hochfeldr, 425 U.S.
185 (1976), held that accountants were not liable in negligence under rule 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.
35 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968). See also cases cited in note 6 supra.
36 See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Brasenoff, Yavner, & Jacobs, 455
F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972) (applying Rhode Island state law); Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp.
1155 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (applying Iowa state law); Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowici, 527 F. Supp.
683 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (applying Kentucky law); Seedham, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340
(D. Neb. 1979); Shofstall v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (apply-
ing Illinois state law); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275 (D.R.I. 1976) (apply-
ing Pennsylvania state law).
37 284 F. Supp. at 93.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 91. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
40 284 F. Supp. at 91.
41 Id.
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arbitrarily distinguishing between "foreseen" and "foreseeable"
users.42 The single justification for this distinction pertains to limit-
ing the auditor's liability. As posited earlier, this contingency can be
adequately insured against.43 Furthermore, the whole threat of inde-
terminate liability is arguably overstated. 44 Parties who detrimen-
tally rely on inaccurate financial statements will be limiteal to' their
damages occasioned by the misstatement. Secondly, the fact that
plaintiffs must comply with the statute of limitations, which gener-
ally starts to run at the point of reliance, 45 is a limitation. Lastly,
plaintiffs are subject to the defense of contributory negligence.
There is apparently no reason for preferring a foreseen user over
a foreseeable one. Neither party pays for the audit, and neither party
is owed a greater duty of care from the accountant. Since modern
auditors fully expect third parties to rely on their opinions, the dis-
tinction is simply indefensible. Worse yet, a clever accountant could
circumvent the Restatement provision by asking his client not to re-
veal the intended users of the statements.
The Restatement position implies that an auditor should be
more careful when he knows of the user's, or limited class of user's,
identity. This is an implication that any auditor would refute.
II. H Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler and Citizens State Bank v. Timm,
Schmidt & Co.
Against this backdrop of transition from Ultramares to Rusch Fac-
tors, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the Rosenblum case.
Giant, a publicly-owned corporation, acquired two privately-held
businesses, H. Rosenblum, Inc. and Summit Gift Galleries, Inc., from
the Rosenblums in return for shares of Giant stock.46 The Rosen-
blums relied on five years of Giant's financial statements in deciding
to accept Giant's offer.47 An unqualified opinion from Touche Ross
& Company, Giant's auditors, accompanied each set of financial
statements. 48 Giant had falsified its books, however, adding fictitious
42 See text accompanying note 88 infra.
43 Comment, Accountants' Liability for Negligence: A Contemporag Approach for a Modern Profes-
sion, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 401, 415 n. 81 (1980).
44 Id. at 417-18.
45 Ellis, Malpractice Accrual Adherence to the Common Law in Professional Negligence Actions, 19
IDAHO L. REV. 63, 71-72 (1983).
46 461 A.2d at 141.
47 Id.
48 Id. The fact that the opinions were "unqualified" is inferred from the statement that
"it had examined the statements of earnings and balance sheets 'in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards' and that the financial statements 'present[ed] fairly' Giant's
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assets and omitting substantial accounts payable.49 Consequently,
the 1971 and 1972 financial statements were inaccurate. The fraud
was discovered in 1973, and the trading of Giant stock was immedi-
ately suspended. Giant then filed for bankruptcy, leaving the Rosen-
blums with worthless stock. The Rosenblums filed suit against
Touche Ross, and each of its individual partners, alleging fraudulent
misrepresentation, gross negligence, negligence, and breach of war-
ranty. Touche Ross moved for partial summary judgment, and the
trial court granted the motion on the negligence claim, but only with
respect to the 1971 audit. The Appellate Division affirmed. 50
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.5 1 The New
Jersey court rejected the Ulramares privity doctrine and stated that
accountants who issue opinions without distribution limitations in
the certificates have a duty to exercise ordinary care to a broad class
of users. The court first considered the privity defense itself. The
court noted that both the Ultramares privity doctrine and the Restate-
ment position require at least some relationship between the auditor
and the relying third party.52 The court, analyzing these positions in
terms of a products liability action based on negligence, stated that
financial position." Id. Opinions are given at the conclusion of the audit and express "an
opinion on the fairness with which the financial statements present financial position, results
of operations, and changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles." Statements on Auditing Standards, I AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTI-
FIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, § 110.01 (1972). See also Wiener,
supra note 5, at 237.
49 461 A.2d at 141.
50 Id. at 141-42. Touche Ross' entire motion for partial summary judgment sought to
dismiss the negligence claim regarding the 1971 financial statements and the negligence, gross
negligence, and fraud claims regarding the 1972 audit and financial statements. Id. The trial
court granted the first part of the motion, but denied the motion with respect to the 1972
financial statements. Id. The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal the trial court's deci-
sion on the 1972 financial statement claim, but the New Jersey Supreme Court granted leave
to appeal. rd. Thus, the supreme court reviewed the entire disposition of Touche Ross'
motion.
51 461 A.2d at 156.
52 461 A.2d at 144-45. The Rosenblum court grouped the Restatement position into the
same category as Ultramares:
The only extension in the Restatement beyond Ultramares and Glanzer appears to be
that the auditor need not know the identity of the beneficiaries if they belong to an
identifiable group for whom the information was intended to be furnished ...
Both Ultramares and the Restatement demand a relationship between the relying
third party and the auditor. Unless some policy considerations warrant otherwise,
privity should not be, and is not [in this jurisdiction], a salutary predicate to pre-
vent recovery.
Id. at 145. Thus, the court appears to have characterized the Restatement position as estab-
lishing a privity requirement. Courts that have accepted the Restatement position after re-
jecting privity would probably disagree.
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they had "long ago discarded the privity requirement in products
liability cases based on negligence. ' 53 The court also observed that
products liability damages include compensation, not only for physi-
cal injury, but also for economic loss. 5 4 On this basis, the court de-
cided that plaintiffs could maintain a negligence action for economic
loss against accountants, despite a lack of privity. 55
The court next considered the scope of the duty owed by ac-
countants to third parties. The court held that unless accountants
limited the distribution of their financial statements by a statement
on the certificates,56 their duty of care extended to those reasonably
foreseeable recipients of the statements who (1) received the state-
ments from the company for proper business purposes, and (2) relied
on the statements pursuant to those business purposes.5 7 The court
recognized that this rule would not protect institutional managers,
portfolio managers, and stockholders who do not obtain financial
statements directly from the company, but said that such cases were
not before it and reserved judgment on the issues.5 8 Notably, the
Rosenblum decision is framed, not in terms of the extent of an ac-
countant's liability, but in terms of an accountant's duty. Thus,
when the court considers a case involving institutional and portfolio
53 Id. The court cites precedent for holding persons liable for misrepresentations in prod-
ucts liability cases despite of a lack of privity. Id. at 145-47.
54 Id. at 146. The issue of only having economic loss has been a sticking point in tort law
where recovery has frequently been denied if only economic harm was suffered. Fortunately,
the distinction is less important today, for the harm caused by an accountant's negligence is
essentially always economic. Id.
55 Id. at 146-47.
56 Id. at 152. The court stated that "auditors could in some circumstances, such as when
auditing a privately owned company, expressly limit in their certificates the persons or class of
persons who would be entitled to rely upon the audit." Id. Given the nature and purpose of
audits, one would not expect accounting firms to frequently use disclaimers. After all, au-
dited reports are designed for persons to rely on in making business decisions. One would
anticipate that the courts will scrutinize such disclaimers as they do a manufacturer's dis-
claimer of implied warranties. The court here stated that "[i]n the final analysis the injured
party should recover damages due to an independent auditor's negligence from that auditor.
This would shift the loss from the innocent creditor or investor to the one responsible for the
loss." Id. The court's concern with providing relief to injured parties runs contrary to a
broad ability to limit the dissemination of the financial statements and consequent reliance
upon them.
57 Id. at 153. In addition to these requirements, the court enunciated further limits.
First, recovery is limited to the actual loss flowing from the reliance. Second, the amount of
recovery is governed by the Comparative Negligence Act, 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 15-5.1 (West
Supp. 1983). Third, the accounting firm can seek indemnity or contribution from the audited
company and the "blameworthy" officers and employees. Id. at 152. This limitation actually
provides accountants little help, however, for the accountant is usually sued only after the
company has become insolvent.
58 461 A.2d at 153. See text accompanying note 89 infra.
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managers or stockholders, the court could easily extend the duty of
care to cover these parties as well.
Shortly after the Rosenblum decision was announced, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court, in Czlizens State Bank, found accountants liable
for negligence to an even broader class of plaintiffs.59 Citz -ens State
Bank presented the same basic issues as Rosenblum. The accounting
firm of Timm, Schmidt & Company prepared financial statements
for Clintonville Fire Apparatus, Inc. (CFA) for the years 1973-1976
and issued unqualified opinions on the 1974-1976 statements. 60 After
reviewing CFA's financial statements, Citizens State Bank loaned
CFA a total of $380,000. While preparing the 1976 statements,
Timm Schmidt found that errors in the 1974 and 1975 statements
had significantly overstated CFA's assets. 6 1 Timm Schmidt corrected
the errors and informed Citizens State Bank.62 The bank subse-
quently called all of the CFA loans due. CFA was unable to repay
the loans, went into receivership, and was liquidated and dissolved.
Citizens State Bank sued Timm Schmidt and its malpractice insur-
ance company for the unpaid balance of the loans. Timm Schmidt
made a motion for summary judgment which the Wisconsin trial
court granted, finding that Timm Schmidt's negligence did not ex-
tend to Citizens State Bank even under Restatement Section 552.63
The Court of Appeals affirmedr 4
On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the
lack of privity with an accountant should not bar recovery by an
injured third party who relied on the accountant's statements. 65 The
court recognized that previous decisions rejecting the Ultramares priv-
ity doctrine had usually embraced the Restatement position, but also
noted that the Restatement does not extend liability to allforeseeable
users of the financial statements. 66 The court concluded that
59 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis. 1983).
60 335 N.W.2d 361, 362.
61 Id. According to the statement of the facts, the errors, taken together, totalled over
S400,000. Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 363-64. In an apparent effort to avoid liability under the Restatement position,
each accountant of the firm who worked on the CFA audit submitted an affidavit that he had
no knowledge that CFA either had obtained or was intending to obtain loans from Citizens
State Bank. The affidavit of the president also indicated that no one informed him that CFA
intended to use the statements to acquire loans from any source. Id.
64 Id. at 364.
65 Id. at 365. See also text accompanying notes 77-82 infra.
66 335 N.W.2d at 366. The court concluded: "The Restatement's statement of limiting
liability to certain third parties is too restrictive a statement of policy factors for this court to
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[A]ccountants' liability to third parties should be determined under
the accepted principles of Wisconsin negligence law. Liability will
be imposed on. . .accountants for the forseeable injuries resulting
from their negligent acts unless, under the facts of [the] particular
case, as a matter of policy to be decided by the court, recovery is
denied on grounds of public policy.67
The court thus adopted the most expansive scope of liability for ac-
countants' negligence to date. However, the court did say that this
liability would be limited by public policy considerations on a case-
by-case basis.68 These case-by-case policy considerations are those
normally applied in negligence cases, and not special factors applied
only to accountants.
Both the Rosenblum and Citizens State Bank positions extend liabil-
ity beyond the Restatement position in that both decisions extend
the auditor's duty of reasonable care to plaintiffs who are foreseeable,
while the Restatement limits liability to foreseen plaintiffs. There is
a distinction between Rosenblum and Citizens State Bank, as well. The
Rosenblum decision extends a duty of care only to a sub-class of all
foreseeable plaintiffs: those who receive financial statements from
the company and rely on them pursuant to a proper business pur-
pose. On the other hand, Citizens State Bank extends the duty of rea-
sonable care to all foreseeable plaintiffs, in line with general
negligence liability.
III. Case Analysis
Several factors influenced the Rosenblum court's decision to
broaden the accountants' scope of negligence liability. First, the
court recognized that the auditor's function has changed over the
years from that of a management tool to that of an independent
evaluator of the accuracy of financial statements issued by manage-
adopt." Id. Judge Wiener also criticizes the Restatement position. See Wiener, supra note 5,
at 251-52.
67 335 N.W.2d at 366. See notes 83-85 infra and accompanying text.
68 Id. The court listed a number of such policy reasons set out in previous negligence
cases:
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out
of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it
appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about
the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a
burden on the negligent tortfeasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be
too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would
enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Id. These public policy factors are to be weighed by the trial court only after a full factual
resolution of the case. Id. at 366-67.
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ment and used by third parties not in privity with the auditor.69
This transition makes the auditor's function fit Glanzer's "end aim of
the transaction" rationale and undercuts the rationale used by the
Utltramarei court to distinguish Glanzer.70 Second, the court dismissed
the Ultramares "financial catastrophe" objection to a broad duty of
care for accountants. The court noted that, under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, auditors and others
were liable for certain damages resulting from erroneous financial
statements, and that they were already covering themselves through
insurance and other means. 7' The court reasoned that accountants
could obtain similar malpractice insurance for an extended duty of
care. 72 By answering this objection, the court eliminated the major
policy reason supporting Ultramares limited liability: potential "inde-
terminate liability." 73
Third, the court found an expanded duty could result in stricter
auditing standards and more thorough reviews, thus reducing the in-
cidence of negligent audits.74 Increased fees for this work and in-
creased insurance costs would not preclude these changes since the
costs could be passed on to the business being audited, and ulti-
mately to the consuming public. Finally, the court felt that innocent
third parties required some protection from erroneous financial state-
ments. 75 Both the third and final reasons echo the .Rusch Factors ra-
tionale, where these same reasons were used to impose liability as
69 Id. at 149. The Securities & Exchange Commission has commented on the public
accountant's responsibility as follows:
The responsibility of a public accountant is not only to the client who pays his fee,
but also to investors, creditors and others who may rely on the financial statements
which he certifies. . . .The public accountant must report fairly on the facts as he
finds them whether favorable or unfavorable to his client. His duty is to safeguard
the public interest, not that of his client.
In the Matter of Touche, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957). The first sentence in the AICPA's Code
of Ethics says that a distinguishing mark of a professional is his acceptance of responsibility to
the public. Thereafter the Code refers to the shift in responsibility to the public caused by the
increased number of investors and government regulations. Fiflis, Current Problems of Account-
ant's Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REv. 31, 105-07 (1975), see also Mess, supra
note 5, at 506; Wiener, supra note 5, at 250-51.
70 See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
71 461 A.2d at 151. The court gave a brief yet detailed discussion of certain liabilities
already imposed upon auditors. The actions allowed are not limited to cases involving fraud;
some even require a showing, by the auditor, of freedom from negligence.
72 Id. This reasoning appears to be well founded. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 415
& n. 81.
73 See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
74 461 A.2d at 152. See also Mess, supra note 5, at 856; Note, Public Accountants and Attor-
neys. Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 588, 605-06 (1972).
75 461 A.2d at 152.
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expressed by the Restatement, in spite of a lack of privity.7 6
Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court based its decision in Cit-
izens State Bank on a number of the same policy factors. In its opin-
ion, after tracing the role of privity through the accountants' liability
cases, 77 the court considered Auric v. Continental Casually Co. ,78 a legal
malpractice case it had decided earlier in 1983. The court considered
the policy of making attorneys more diligent in their work important
in reaching that decision.79 The Citizens State Bank court thought the
Auric policy well-suited to the accountants in the Citiens State Bank
case.80 Extending liability for accountants' negligence would make
accountants more careful in their work. The court also reasoned that
if liability were not imposed, third parties would not be protected
and accountants' negligence would go undeterred. 8' These last two
reasons are reminiscent of the Rusch Factors and Rosenblum courts' pol-
icy considerations. Rusch Factors and Rosenblum obviously affected the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's thinking, and both cases are referred to
in the Citizens State Bank opinion.82
After concluding that the absence of privity should not bar a
negligence action against accountants, the court next turned to the
scope of liability. Again, the policy factors-were decisive. The court
rejected the Restatement's restricted scope of liability as "too restric-
tive a statement of policy factors for this court to adopt. '83 In this
instance, however, the court did not elaborate on the specific policy
reasons. The statement is in the context of the declaration that "[t]he
fundamental principle of Wisconsin negligence law is that a
tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act ex-
cept as those consequences are limited by policy factors. '84 The
court may well have reasoned that there was no reasonable basis for
applying a lesser duty of care to auditors than to other persons; there-
fore, the same duty should be applied. This reasoning would not be
76 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
77 The court examined Ultramares and Rusch Factors as well .as Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969), in which the Iowa Supreme Court applied Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 552 to find accountants liable for negligence to a foreseen third party.
78 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983). In that case, the court found an attorney
liable to a will beneficiary for negligently supervising the execution of a will. Id. at 514, 331
N.W.2d at 330.
79 Id. at 513, 331 N.W.2d at 329. See Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335
N.W.2d 361, 365.
80 335 N.W.2d at 365.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 364-66. See notes 41, 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
83 335 N.W.2d at 366. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
84 335 N.W.2d at 366. See note 68 supra.
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without merit. Negligence liability is normally based on a duty of
reasonable care founded on foreseeability; this was established long
ago in Palsgraf.8 5 One can view Ultramares as limiting an auditors
duty of care from that expressed three years earlier in Palsgraf be-
cause of the existence of the policy factors expressed by Cardozo. To-
day however, those policy factors are no longer valid, no new policies
support such a limitation, and there are no definite policy reasons
supporting a full duty of care. Therefore, auditors should revert to
"normal" status and have a duty of reasonable care to all foreseeable
plaintiffs.
Because Rosenblum and Citizens State Bank were cases of first im-
pression, the New Jersey and Wisconsin Supreme Courts could freely
examine the policy issues behind Ultramares and the Restatement
before deciding what position to adopt. In both cases, the courts ex-
amined the Ultramares privity concept and the Restatement position,
and found both unconvincing. Instead, the courts adopted positions
based primarily on foreseeability considerations.
The courts correctly rejected the Ultramares privity standard.
The policy factors used to support the decisions are valid and con-
vincing. The spectre of financial catastrophe to accountants is no
longer a valid concern. As the critics have pointed out, the account-
ing field is no longer a weak, fledgling industry,8 6 and insurance for
professional negligence is readily available. Further, the transition of
the modern auditor's function has moved him squarely into the
Glanzer rationale87 since his product-the financial statements and
his opinion-are intended not only for management, but also for third
parties. In addition, an innocent third party who relies on an ac-
countant's audit to his detriment should not be so quickly left with-
out a remedy.
Furthermore, the courts correctly extended accountants' liabil-
ity for negligence beyond the Restatement position. Once again, an
innocent third party should not pay for the consequences of an ac-
countant's negligence. No valid policy reasons justify contracting an
accountant's liability for negligence to something less than the nor-
mal scope of tort liability, foreseeability. Chief Justice Sheran of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota strongly criticized such intermediate-
level positions:
85 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
86 See note 22 supra.
87 See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text. See also Wiener, supra note 5, at 250 &
n.89.
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If [an accountant's] liability is to be drawn somewhere short of for-
seeability, it must be drawn on pragmatic grounds alone. Once it is
admitted that a certain number of people have been injured as a
result of an accountant's malpractice, there is no logical justifica-
tion for denying any of them relief based on the "limited" or "un-
limited" nature of their "class," or whether the reliance of the
particular party was or was not "specifically forseeable."' a
IV. Conclusion
Evaluating whether the Rosenblum standard is better than the
Citizens State Bank standard is impossible. Each standard represents a
particular court's attempt to balance the burden of enlarging the cir-
cle of liability for negligent accountants against the burden of the
economic injury suffered by third parties who rely on an account-
ant's defective product. Since the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ro-
senblum expressly withheld an opinion on the duty of care owed to
persons not receiving financial statements directly from the com-
pany, liability to such persons remains undecided. 89 After the New
Jersey Supreme Court decides such a case, the final positions of the
two states may not differ significantly.
Both decisions still provide accountants some protection from
unlimited liability. The Rosenblum standard is more of a bright-line
decision. The prerequisites, acquisition of an accountant's report di-
rectly from the company and a proper business purpose, provide a
special safeguard against unlimited liability. The Citizens State Bank
standard is less definite, requiring more case-by-case analysis by both
jury and judge. Since it uses the same type of analysis already ap-
plied as an integral part of general negligence law, the standard is
simply an application of the public policy considerations generally
applied to negligence cases. Given these limitations, both standards
should be workable.
The persuasive authority of Ultramares has greatly diminished,
and more courts will now move further away from the Ultrarnares
privity standard. For years, the area of accountants' liability for neg-
ligence has been an anachronism, hanging on to the last vestiges of
the privity doctrine. Courts in general have framed the duty of care
in other negligence cases in accord with another famous Cardozo
88 Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 129-30, 248 N.W.2d 291, 302 (1976). Bonhiver did
not purport to establish a general rule for accountants' liability in negligence to third parties;
rather, it simply decided that given the particular facts of the case, the accountants had a
duty to the particular party involved.
89 461 A.2d at 153.
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phrase: "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed."' 9 Perhaps now, with the decisions of Rosenblum and Citzens
State Bank, the gap between these two standards will close. Surely,
the time has come.
Mark D. Boveri
Brent E. Marshall
90 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
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